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From the Chair
Welcome to the fifth issue of our
Newsletter. The case for the
importance of the humanities,
philosophy among them, needs always
to be made afresh. Public funding is
unpredictable — as we see with the
recent announcement from the Arts
and Humanities Research Council of a
reduction in the number of graduate
studentships to be offered. No doubt
times will continue to be interesting.
But the contributions in the Newsletter
provide many reasons for cheer. They
bear witness, among other things, to
the influence of Cambridge philosophy
in surprising places and to the
powerful attraction which studying
philosophy can exert.
The Editor of the Newsletter since
the first edition in 2004 has been Mrs
Mariella Pellegrino. The warm
response to it shows what an excellent
job she has done. Mrs Pellegrino has
also been very active in building up the
Faculty’s archives and in making
available interesting historical material.
Some of you may have met her at the
exhibitions which the Faculty has
mounted at recent Alumni Weekends.
She and her family have now moved to
California. The Faculty and the readers
of the Newsletter are grateful to her
for her notable contribution. Mrs
Jennifer Lecky-Thompson, our new
Librarian, will be editor from the next
edition.
The Faculty will also have a new
Chairman from later this year, when
Dr Alex Oliver takes over. So I take
this opportunity of sending best wishes
to you all. I hope I shall have the
opportunity of meeting many of you at
future Faculty and Alumni events.
Jane Heal FBA
Professor of Philosophy
Chair of the Faculty Board
Radical Hope
Jonathan Lear
Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is
inherently bound up with forms of life
has been extensively examined — to a
significant extent in Cambridge — for
the light it sheds on language, mind and
action. But there is an ethical question
that has not been paid the attention it
deserves. If forms of life are vulnerable
to the vagaries of historical and natural
change, it would seem that
meaningfulness somehow inherits that
vulnerability. What would it be to live
well with this vulnerability? I take this
question to be ethical in the broadly
Socratic sense of trying to figure out
how one should live. And though it
may become most pressing in times of
crisis, the question confronts
us insofar as we are human.
For even at a time when a
form of life is robust, it
remains vulnerable. To figure
out what it would be to live
well with this possibility,
whether it is actualized or
not, would be to face up to
the ethical dimension of
Wittgenstein’s insight.
My thought was captured
by a haunting phrase of
Plenty Coups, the last great
Chief of the Crow Nation.
Speaking of the painful
transition from the Crow’s
traditional nomadic-hunting-
warrior way of life to the as-
yet inchoate forms of
reservation life, Plenty Coups
said, “After the buffalo went
away, the hearts of my
people fell to the ground and
they could not lift them up
again. After this, nothing
happened.” Were I an
anthropologist, I might have
wanted to figure out what he
meant. But as a philosopher,
I wanted to carry out a historically and
anthropologically informed thought-
experiment: what might he have meant if
he were not speaking metaphorically, but
trying to stand witness to things ceasing
to happen? Here I was influenced by two
philosophers who are not much studied
in the Cambridge curriculum,
Kierkegaard and Heidegger. In different
ways, each is interested in the
philosophical significance of a figure
willing to take responsibility for a form
of life, by articulating what its limit
conditions are. Plenty Coups, as I
interpret him, is saying not merely that it
is no longer possible to hunt and battle,
but that these activities had ceased to be
intelligible ways to live. A young
Jonathan Lear
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member of the tribe might get on a
horse, take a bow and arrow and sneak
off the reservation, but it wouldn’t
matter: neither that nor anything else
would make sense as going into battle
or going on a hunt. But then neither
would anything make sense as
preparing to go into battle or on a
hunt. But hitherto everything in Crow
life — all customs and rituals as well as
all aspects of daily life — could be
understood either as going into battle
or on a hunt or preparing to do so. So
if there were a moment when all of
these happenings ceased to make sense
as ways to live, and if one were trying
within that form of life to stand witness
to its demise, one might well say, “After
this, nothing happened.”
This raises a painful, yet challenging
question for virtue ethics. If we think of
young men and women brought up on
a traditional understanding of, say,
courage, we think of them as being
trained to face courageously a whole
range of possibilities that life may
throw their way. A capacity for dealing
well with possibilities is instilled within
their souls. But what if one has to face
the possibility that this range of
possibilities itself collapses or is
destroyed? How might one face
courageously the collapse of courage as
it has been instilled in one’s soul from
early youth? One might say that there
are no virtues other than as they appear
in particular cultural embeddings, and
thus that there is no way virtuously to
face the collapse of virtue. But another
course, which I favor, is to hold that the
cultural embeddings of the virtues can
point beyond themselves – not
necessarily to a transcendent Platonic
idea, but to imaginative and virtuous
ways of going on that transcend the
particular embedding from which they
arose. Anyone who would like to bring
Platonic or Aristotelian-inspired ethics
into the twenty-first century ought to
be thinking about how this is possible.
I call hope radical when one
maintains it through a period in which
one lacks the concepts to know what to
hope for. It is a period in which, one
might say, a form of life is itself in
abeyance. This is one way in which
humans can embrace their finite
condition: acknowledging that their
form of life’s conception of the good
might not exhaust the subject. How
this is possible is a fascinating
psychological story which gives
imagination a crucial role in ethical life.
How it might differ from reprehensible
forms of collaboration and acceptance
is a crucial moral issue. And, more
generally, what might legitimate it is in
a tradition of questions about the
standing of hope that works its way
back through Kant to Plato. 
Ironically, the Crow themselves
started reading Radical Hope and I was
invited to the reservation, to Little Big
Horn College, to talk to faculty and
students about it. My visits have been
moving in many ways, but what
fascinates me is that what students and
faculty want to talk about is
philosophy. They are pleased I am not
there to study them, but to talk with
them. And what they want to talk
about is an analogy I made between
Socrates’ daimon — who gives no
positive advice — and the figure of the
Chickadee, an ideal in Crow culture of
learning from the wisdom of others,
while leaving it entirely open what
counts as wisdom and who are the
others who have it. Imagine spending
an afternoon discussing Republic 505e
with Crow who feel they know from
vivid experience what it is like to be
trying to aim one’s life towards the
good, while only having the dimmest
glimmer of what that good could
possibly be. It is not that the Crow
want to assimilate to western culture,
but they do want to have a
conversation with it. They are very
proud of being Crow; but also proud
that their experience might fit into a
larger conversation. Above all, they do
not want the current fashion for
identity politics to isolate them from
that conversation. The idea that simply
by studying Plato they might be subject
to cultural hegemony, they find
patronizing. 
My studies in Cambridge, first as a
student, then as a Lecturer in the
Philosophy Faculty have been the sine
qua non for everything that has come
since. I learned much from my
teachers, then colleagues, about how to
read and think carefully; but, most
importantly, I was able to see from
their example that philosophy could be
a living activity. This is a life-time gift.
Jonathan Lear (Clare) was in
Cambridge 11 years, between 1970
and 1985. He is the John U. Nef
Distinguished Service Professor at 
the Committee on Social Thought
and in the Department of Philosophy
at the University of Chicago.
ALUMNI WEEKEND 2008
Saturday 27 September
G.E. Moore: a Lecture and an Exhibition
Speaker: Professor Tom Baldwin, York University
Location and time TBA
For more information please contact Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy; phone +44 1223 331889; 
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
A buffet lunch will be served in the Faculty from 12:30pm to 1:30pm. 
Please see Alumni Weekend 2008 booklet for details about booking and cost.
FESTIVAL OF IDEAS IN ARTS, HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
22 October — 2 November 2008
Baroness Onora O’ Neill, 
President of the British Academy, Honorary Professor of
Ethical and Political Philosophy, formerly Principal 
and now Honorary Fellow of Newnham College, will
deliver a lecture on ‘Conceptions of Press Freedom’ on
Wednesday 22 October 2008. Location TBA
THIRD ROUTLEDGE LECTURE
Thursday 30 October 2008
Professor Richard Moran, the Brian D. Young Professor of
Philosophy at Harvard University, will deliver the third
Routledge Lecture. Title and location TBA
Further details about these lectures will be available on the Faculty
website: http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk
Future Events
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In September 2007, as part of the University’s Alumni Weekend,
the Faculty mounted an exhibition charting the history of
philosophy in Cambridge. We began with Henry Sidgwick, at
the time that the board which regulated study in the Moral
Sciences was evolving into something similar to the Faculty
today. We traced the story through Hegelian idealism,
represented by McTaggart, and its overthrow by Russell, Moore
and Wittgenstein, who between them made Cambridge the
centre of Anglophone philosophy. The inter-war years were
represented by Broad, Braithwaite and Wisdom. Wittgenstein’s
influence was marked by his three successors as Professor—von
Wright, Wisdom, and Elizabeth Anscombe—with Braithwaite
and Lewy as the healthy dissenters. We concluded the exhibition
with Anscombe and Bernard Williams, two of the most
important philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. 
We wanted to recognise that the influence of Cambridge
philosophers has not been limited to academic philosophy.
Frank Ramsey wrote some of the finest philosophy in
Cambridge, but also produced important work in mathematics
and economics. John Maynard Keynes also went on to
economics, revolutionising it both in theory and in practice. A
little later, Alan Turing took his results in mathematical logic
Philosophy at Cambridge through the Years
Ben Colburn
Minutes of the MSC from the famous Poker meeting
A section of the exhibition in the Casimir Lewy Library
and laid the foundations for the modern
science of computing.
There is an extraordinary amount of
material concerning the history of
philosophy in Cambridge, only a
fraction of which we ended up using.
Some exhibits were rather famous, e.g.
the minutes of the Moral Sciences Club
meeting in which Wittgenstein and
Popper had an altercation involving a
poker. Others have remained buried in
various Cambridge archives for decades.
How many people, I wonder, have seen
Moore’s comments on Keynes’
undergraduate essay on
consequentialism? (Moore wrote in
irritable red pencil, ‘You have missed the
main point!’) Visitors to the exhibition
were especially delighted by an exchange
of letters between Lewy and
Braithwaite, in which Braithwaite wrote
a letter which so incensed his colleague
that Lewy scribbled annotations in the
margin: ‘Oh!’ ‘Oh!’ ‘Confusion!’ and so
on. Braithwaite later admitted ‘My
remark … was blague — to get a rise
out of you!’ Such treasures from the
vaults — and Patricia Williams’
generosity in lending us some items from
Bernard Williams — brought the
personal history of the Faculty to life,
and allowed us to celebrate not only the
great philosophical work that has been
done in Cambridge, but also the great
philosophical characters who have done
it.
Ben Colburn
Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy
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it wasn’t what I fundamentally
wanted to do. In the intervening
years I did try to keep up with
philosophy through reading, but
there’s no substitute for real
philosophical dialogue, and I missed
that. So here I am – I hope it’s the
first stage in a career change. 
In some ways it’s hard to imagine a
more drastic change in a working
life. People sometimes talk about a
“real” world outside the life of
study, but this is work too of
course, like my previous life, and
sometimes it’s just as stressful and
busy. There are deadlines and
pressures here too, and there is (I
hope) going to be a finished product
at the end of it. I was really
surprised to find out how badly I
managed my time when I didn’t
have clients phoning up to ask if I’d
done this or that.
Of course there were some
difficulties: philosophical skills get
rusty no matter how interested in the
subject you are. It can take a while to
get up to speed if you’ve been out of
formal education for a while. Legal
work tends to be a series of focused,
self-contained tasks, but trying to
grapple with a philosophical problem
in a sustained way needs a different
kind of focus. Philosophical
problems are not like other
problems…! 
Cambridge is a great place to be
studying philosophy. Am I glad I
made the change? Certainly.
Lewis Evans, PhD student in the
Faculty of Philosophy
I used to be a commercial lawyer
working for a large City firm. When
I decided to go back to studying
philosophy I was coming towards
the end of a two year stint in the
firm’s very hectic Tokyo office. I’m
now in my third year of study for a
PhD in philosophy here at
Cambridge, supervised by Jane Heal.
Maybe some people drift into doing
a PhD while they work out what
they “really” want to do, but that
wasn’t the case with me. It wasn’t a
decision taken lightly. So why did I
make the change? My first degree
was in philosophy and I’ve always
found the subject compelling and
fascinating, especially problems
centred around the self — What is
it? Is it real? — which are what I’m
working on here. Although I did a
law conversion course, and went on
to work as a lawyer, I suppose
philosophy never really lost its grip
on me and I was always curious to
know how it might have turned out
if I’d carried on with it. My legal
work was often very interesting too,
with a buzz driven by adrenaline a
lot of the time, but I came to realise
Bookshop   |   1 Trinity Street   |   Cambridge cb2 1sz
t: 01223 333333
e: bookshop@cambridge.org
w: www.cambridge.org/bookshop
We have the full range of all Philosophy
titles from Cambridge at our Bookshop in
the heart of the city. Come and see us.
With your blue student card you are 
entitled to 20% off any title!
Lewis Evans
From Law t
Lewis Evans
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We were honeymooning on the Playa
del Carmen when we decided. “Let’s
not go back.” “OK.” “Seriously.” “Yes
seriously.” “Seriously?” Like everyone
else, we went back. But a few weeks
later we quit for real. 
Tammy and I were lawyers in the
same office on 53rd Street, specialising
in structured finance. The work was
challenging and (usually) interesting,
and delightfully well paid, and all-
consuming. (The great thing about an
office romance in New York is that
you actually see each other.) It wasn’t a
bad life, but you have to live and
breathe it, and we realised on
honeymoon that we really didn’t want
to look back from our deathbeds on
lives spent helping rich people get
slightly richer. (Or as it’s turned out,
since our firm was heavily involved in
US mortgage securitisations, rather
poorer.) And we wanted to know our
children.
So Tammy moved into international
public health, and, ten years after my
BA, I was going back to philosophy.
But not before a three-month dream
trip around the world.
Getting back to university was easier
than I’d feared. I called an old teacher,
expecting “Who?” but getting an
encouraging “Good!”. A couple of
people remembered me well enough to
give references. My undergraduate
philosophy essays being both ten years
old and well lost, I manufactured writing
samples in a series of Asian hotel rooms. 
Getting back into philosophy was
harder. Lawyering had kept my
analytical skills alive, and to my relief I
still found the material absorbing. But
I’d forgotten much more than I’d
realised, and my “insights” often turned
out to be obvious errors, or old news.
The field has moved on. And some
things are just done differently in
phlegmatic English climes. For example,
the Canberra Plan metaphysics that
seemed so cutting-edge in New Zealand
in the early 1990’s has come to look
rather battle-weary. Great thanks are due
to my supervisors, who went well
beyond their statutory duties to nurse me
through the MPhil and onto the PhD.
Social life was also a concern. I was
going to be a very mature student, twice
the age of the average first-year. But I
was more worried about the age gap
than anyone else was, and our little boy
now has a collection of twenty-
something “uncles” and future piano
teachers.
So was it a good decision? Ask me
again in a couple of years. Getting a job
in philosophy is tough, and this could
yet turn out to be just a very long
honeymoon. But so far both Tammy and
I have enjoyed our new lives, and even if
I end up back in tax law, I’ll be glad I did
it.
Adrian Boutel, PhD student in the
Faculty of Philosophy
Philosophy from Cambridge – all your questions answered!
www.cambridge.org 
An Introduction 
to the 
Philosophy of 
Language
By Michael Morris 
The Logic of 
Real Arguments 
(2nd Edition)
By Alec Fisher
Explaining 
Social Behaviour 
– More Nuts and 
Bolts for the 
Social Sciences
By Jon Elster
Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy of 
Religion
By Julian Young
Adrian Boutel with his son Skander
o Philosophy
Adrian Boutel
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In the catalogue of my solo exhibition
RoadMovies, at Edinburgh
University’s Talbot Rice Art Gallery,
in 2002, I suggested that my art was
the ‘pursuit of philosophy by other
means’. That sums up happily enough
the influence reading Moral Sciences
has had on my creative life.
At school ‘creative life’ had consisted
mainly of writing music — poor organ
fugues, crass concertos — whose
quality was less vital than the valve
music provided. My hope to do a PhD
under Ross Harrison, comparing the
linguistics of music-language and
word-language, was scuttled by my
lazy performance in Part II. In the
meantime, however, I had met David
Hockney and followed his suggestion
that I should paint and draw. He is a
wordful, thoughtful artist, in a verbal
tradition (too little heeded) that
includes most spectacularly the van
Gogh of the Letters, a tradition that
cannot divorce visual art from a
certain philosophical urgency, invoking
in particular moral thought but also
including epistemological curiosity.
This is neither hard-core Quine or
soft-porn Bergson, but more akin to
the spiritual challenge represented for
me most of all by the Wittgenstein
who writes both pertinently and
evocatively: ‘How can one learn the
truth by thinking? As one learns to
see a face better if one draws it.’
(Zettel, 255) Wittgenstein’s ferreting
“method” — wrestling with trails of
thought such as the ‘field of vision’ —
hails from Nietzsche at least and
neither author is ever far from my
desk or bed. But the same method
also characterises the Cubist
rationale, if only because we, things
and mutual parameters are all in time,
and shift. 
For representational artists in the
last hundred years this is the
compelling truth and challenge. So,
when it was suggested to me a couple
of years ago that I do a set of Stations
of the Cross for a church in London,
a to-and-fro discussion with the
parish priest about Nietzsche’s
epistemology blended with the spatial
thinkings of my RoadMovies and,
aided by a bottle of Bowmore, led me
to the idea of doing these not as views
of Jesus, a bearded chap over yonder
bent double lugging His log, but as if
we see what He would be seeing. This
version, ‘as from the eyes of Jesus’,
serves to create a theological
precedent — be that a time-bomb or
not — in that it suggests something
pre-textual, ‘pre-church’, not an
official vision of How You Are To See
Him, but an inquisitive and intimate
vision of What If You Were He? This
is a shift of textual perspective at once
simple and sudden and perhaps, in a
world dangerously polarised by texts,
potently textless... 
Jonathon Brown read Moral
Sciences at Pembroke (1974–78).
His book I Don’t Know Much
About Art But I Know David
Hockney was published in 2007 and
his gift of a painting to the Faculty
will be unveiled at the Alumni
Weekend in September 2008. His
website is at www.villaparasol.com.
Nietzsche's Walk, Eze-Village to Eze-Bord-de-Mer, oil crayon, graphite & ink on paper; 2008; © Jonathan Brown
Part I, Part II, Part Yonder...
Jonathon Brown
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The Moral Sciences Club
Barbara Kay
The meeting of the Moral Sciences
Club — but the science was singular
in my day — as depicted in the third
issue of the Newsletter, inspired me
to visit the attic in search of the
Programme Cards for the academic
year 1943–44, when as Barbara
Hopkins I was the Club’s honorary
secretary. What I write now is based
on these cards, on my scant
memories, and the additional archive
material sent to me by Professor
Heal.
I find it difficult to write about the
Moral Sciences Club without reference
to the Faculty in general during the
wartime years. Most undergraduates
were conscripted or drafted into work
‘of national importance’ before the
end of their course. Thus, the Faculty
was very small, so that the teaching
staff, together with the postgraduate
students, appeared at times to
outnumber the undergraduates. As I
recall, the Faculty had no
headquarters of its own apart from the
library, so that the lectures, or
challenging conversations as they
often were, sometimes with
refreshments in the shape of tea served
in soup-bowls, took place in the
lecturers’ own rooms. This engendered
a spirit of informality, which was
entirely lacking in the experience of
my college friends who belonged to
the larger and more popular faculties.
I never set foot in the Mill Lane lecture
rooms, since I chose the Psychology
option for Part II of the Tripos and the
lectures took place in the separate
Psychology Laboratory, in which
research on behalf of the armed
services also took place.
In retrospect, I feel that some of
the teaching was decidedly eccentric,
and this applies also to some of the
staff and students, about whom
many interesting rumours were
circulated.
To revert to the Moral Science
Club, although the Faculty was so
limited in number, the list of those to
whom Programme Cards were sent is
impressive, and reflects the fact that
some of the London Colleges, such as
Bedford and the LSE, were evacuated
to Cambridge during the war. The list
includes eminent names from the
period such as Thouless, Mace, von
Hayek, and Stebbings as well as some
of their students. There were also
sporadic attendances from the
theological colleges such as Ridley
Hall.
During my year in office, Professor
Broad was President. The Chairman,
Professor Wittgenstein, I saw but
once and was never formally
introduced to him, although
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
without which no philosophy student
could expect to be taken seriously,
spent many years on my bookshelves.
I missed the curious incident of the
red-hot poker by two or three years.
My predecessor as Secretary was
Margaret Milbanke, the first person
in Cambridge to welcome me into the
Faculty. She later became an
educational psychologist in North
Yorkshire, when we renewed a
friendship that lasted for the rest of
her life.
There were sixteen meetings during
the academic year of 1942–43, and
twelve in the year 1943–44. Three
were joint meetings with the
Aristotelian Society, and two were
‘starred’ meetings at which a paper
was read by an undergraduate and
was open to all members ‘except
professors and lecturers’. They were
usually chaired by Richard
Braithwaite, and held in his rooms at
King’s. The speakers were drawn from
the resident staff, from the pool of
London evacuees, and from outside
visitors, although because of restricted
travel in wartime, there were perhaps
fewer of these than would be expected
today. The subjects ranged from the
straightforward (MacKinnon on
Kant’s Theory of Truth) to the more
controversial (Wisdom on Must
Philosophers Disagree?), to some
more wide-ranging (von Hayek on the
Facts of the Social Sciences), and some
plain incomprehensible (Maxwell on
Does Modern Deontology rest on a
Mistake?). For planning of the year’s
programme, I relied on the help and
guidance of Casimir Lewy, whose
memory I invoke with gratitude and
without whom there would have been
no programme at all.
When I was in office, the annual
subscription was three shillings and
sixpence, but at the AGM it was found
necessary to impose an additional
charge of one shilling in order to
balance the books. At this point I must
acknowledge the kindly intervention
of Professor Broad, who insisted on
my collecting the money without
delay. The main expenditure was on
printing the programme cards (four
pounds and two shillings) and postage
(fifteen shillings and two pence).
My memories of the actual
meetings, and their content, are very
faint. My predecessor wrote excellent
summaries of the papers; my own
minutes are sparse. Nonetheless, I am
proud to have played a part in what I
know to be a prestigious institution,
and even more, to have belonged to a
Faculty whose size made contact
between its members so much more
informal than was possible in larger
Faculties. Where else could one of the
lecturers (who happened also to be
one of the examiners) have written to
an ‘anonymous’ candidate that he
had ‘enjoyed reading your
examination papers’, and another
lecturer have sent a postcard saying
that ‘I think you are pleased with the
result. I am’. And Casimir Lewy,
addressing me as Miss Hopkins in the
manner of the era, wrote me a
postcard hoping that ‘you won’t find
Psychology too boring’. I didn’t! 
Barbara Kay read Moral Sciences at
Newnham (1941–44)
Faculty News
This year the Faculty welcomed
Ben Colburn and Karen Nielsen as
temporary lecturers. Raymond
Geuss was promoted to a personal
Chair.
Several of our graduate students
have been appointed to academic
jobs. Among them, Ben Colburn
will be Research Fellow at Corpus
Christi, Cambridge; Florian
Steinberger will be Research Fellow
at Queens’, Cambridge; Neil
Sinclair has secured a lectureship at
Nottingham University and
Katherine Harloe one at Reading
University.
Tim Button has been awarded a
Kennedy Scholarship to study at
Harvard University next year.
Last August Simon Blackburn
gave the Gavin David Young
lectures at the University of
Adelaide in Australia. He also gave
the Hägerström lectures in Uppsala
and in May he will give the address
at the Annual Balzan Symposium
in Lugano.
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The Images of Time
An Essay on Temporal Representation
ROBIN LE POIDEVIN
The Images of Time is a philosophical investigation of the nature
of time and the mind's ways of representing it. Robin Le
Poidevin examines the ways in which we perceive time and
change, the means by which memory links us with the past, the attempt to
represent change and movement in art, and the nature of fictional time. 
Hardback | September 2007 | 210 pages | 978-0-19-926589-3 | £27.50
PHILOSOPHY FROM OXFORD
The Oxford Handbook of 
Contemporary Philosophy
Edited by FRANK JACKSON and MICHAEL SMITH
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the
definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and 
fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves two of the
world's most eminent philosophers, have assembled more than thirty distin-
guished scholars to contribute  incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the
principal areas of research.
Paperback | November 2007 | 920 pages | 978-0-19-923476-9 | £27.50
1
24-hour credit card hotline 
+44 (0)1536 454534
www.oup.com
On Human Rights
JAMES GRIFFIN
What is a human right? How can we tell whether a proposed
human right really is one? How do we establish the content of
particular human rights, and how do we resolve conflicts
between them? These are pressing questions for philosophers,
political theorists, jurisprudents, international lawyers, and activists. James
Griffin offers answers in his compelling new investigation of human rights.
Hardback | February 2008 | 360 pages| 978-0-19-923878-1 | £25.00
New in Paperback
THE ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY ONLINE
www.rep,routledge.com
With its easy, intuitive user  
environment and special  
resources for users at all levels, 
REP Online is a living and truly 
authoritative work that enriches 
the studies of academics,  
students and general readers
worldwide.
NEW in 2008! 
REP will move to a new platform, providing more advanced search 
Automony software, a timeline of philosophy, and much more 
'...REP Online is sure to dazzle... Highly recommended for 
academic and medium to large public libraries.'
- Christopher Holly, Library Journal
For free trials, pricing information and to subscribe please contact: 
UK & Rest of World Customers: 
Tel: +44(0) 20 7017 6062 
Email: reference.online@tandf.co.uk
From the Editor
I have been delighted with the responses, comments and
suggestions, which I have received from many readers.
Please keep them coming.
I wish Jenni Lecky-Thompson every success with
editing the Newsletter.
Mariella Pellegrino
Please contact:
Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
U.K.
Phone: +44 1223 331889
Fax: +44 1223 335091
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
A downloadable version of the Newsletter is available
from the Faculty website:
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
Philosophy journals from 
Cambridge University Press
New to Cambridge in 2008
Think: Philosophy for Everyone, a publication of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, publishes highly accessible and engaging 
writing by philosophers pre-eminent in their fields.
journals.cambridge.org/thi
The Review of Symbolic Logic a publication of the Association 
of Symbolic Logic will publish Volume1 Issues 1 and 2 mid-2008.
journals.cambridge.org/rsl
Other journals which may also be of interest include:
Philosophy
Religious Studies
Social Philosophy and Policy
Economics and Philosophy 
Utilitas 
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
Legal Theory 
Social Policy and Society
To view a sample copy of any of these journals please visit 
journals.cambridge.org/philosophy
Subscriptions can be taken out at journals@cambridge.org
Telephone + 44 (0)1223 326070 or fax +44 (0)1223 325150
